

INTELLIFAX 28

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORTREPORT NO.

25X1

CD NO.

COUNTRY China/Indochina/USSR/Japan

DATE DISTR. 1 Oct. 1951

SUBJECT Chinese Communist Political and Military
Strategy in Korea

NO. OF PAGES 3

PLACE
ACQUIREDNO. OF ENCL.
(LISTED BELOW)DATE OF
INFO.

REFERENCE COPY

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

25X1

DO NOT CIRCULATE

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE SPY INFORMATION ACT OF 1940, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

REFERENCE COPY
THIS IS UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
DO NOT CIRCULATE

SOURCE

25X1

Document
No Change
 Declass
Class. Chg
Auth.: HI
Date: 15

1. The Chinese Communist offensive in Korea, named operation Revenge, scheduled for 18 September, was postponed until sometime before 13 October for the following reasons:

a. The Japanese Communists objected. They have handled intelligence for the Chinese Communists and have reported that within the past four months 16,000,000 Koreans have been organized into an anti-Communist force, which is built around the Democratic Party of South Korea. If an offensive should penetrate South Korea this force of organized guerrillas would make administration extremely difficult and would interdict lengthy supply lines. The Japanese Communists have also sent direct communications to the Soviet

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

25X1

STATE #	NAVY #	AIR #	NSRB	DISTRIBUTION	CINCFE #	FEAF #	COMSITFIE #	COMUSNAVE #
ARMY	X	EW	X	FBI	COM7THFLT	COMNAVFIL #	CINCPACFLT	ALUSNATAIP

BY CABLE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Party stating that the Korean War should stop, because a victory for the Korean Communists would be the end of the Japanese Communists and a victory for the Chinese over the United States would be the beginning of a war between the USSR and the United States. This communication also states that the Chinese and Soviets have not adequately taken the Japan problem into account in their planning for Asia, that the political line must be changed.

- b. In order to be able to oppose the American Air Forces effectively, the Soviets feel they must maintain 50 secret air fields in North Korea. Within recent days, however, the following airfields in Korea have been completely destroyed or over-run by UN forces: Pyongyang, Ongjin, Hamhung, Sontok, Sinmak, Kyongsong (Kimp'o), and Hansan (Yonpo).² This has disrupted offensive plans.
- c. Heavy rainfall is a third cause of the postponement.

2. MAO Tse-tung has explicitly informed Malenkov that he wants peace in Korea, even though it may require greater appeasement to obtain it. MAO prefers to turn China's major attention to Southeast Asia, in order to get raw materials and to frustrate efforts of the United States to establish bases which will threaten China. He believes that now that the Japanese Treaty is signed the logical course for the United States is to tighten the embargo, blockade the mainland, aid Thailand, the Philippines and Taiwan, and finally encircle Communist China with an Asiatic anti-Communist alliance. By contrast, the Chinese have no guarantee of victory in Korea, though their effort there requires the sacrifice of industrial development, endangers agricultural welfare, and defers a necessary advance toward Socialist economy.

3. The Chinese are aware that the present stage in Korea is extremely dangerous. During recent meetings of the Politburo in Mukden, 120 agenda items were passed over to discuss problems of staging this adventurous war.

4. The Chinese are making demands for extensive use by the Soviets of their Air Forces in the Korean War. They are requesting the Soviets to strike United States Air Force installations on the Ryukyus and Nagoya, and airfields at Sapporo, Aomori, Amawarabi, Niigata, Tachikawa, Kisarazu, Atsugi, Maizuru, Kobe, Kure, Fukuoka and Kageshima of Japan proper. The Chinese have also requested a major air battle over Korea, which implies a Soviet commitment of 1,000 planes. The Soviets, however, have 600 planes in Manchuria of which 65 are long-range types (TU-70 and TU-4). Until 18 September the Soviets had shown no response to these demands.

5. New Soviet tactical airfields, designed for the support of two armored regiments and five artillery divisions are now concentrated on the western front and have as a center, Yonch'on (127-05, 38-06). These airfields are west of the Pyongyang-Kaesong railroad and north and south of Sinch'on (125-30, 38-21), covering an area from Chaeryonggang to Sinwonn'i (125-40, 38-12). In order to avoid expected ground fire, the planes would use a standard flight corridor off Inchon (126-38, 37-28).

6. A major ground battle would be fought on 500 hills between Opyongni (127-53, 37-00) and Kwimoktong (127-24, 37-56). The purposes of this offensive would be to create equilibrium between the western and eastern fronts, to regain the initiative, to bring pressure to affect the Kaesong peace talks, and to use a shooting war for a foundation for a cold war with the ultimate objective of bringing the negotiations for a cease fire to a satisfactory conclusion, not of driving the enemy into the sea.

-3-

25X1

1. [REDACTED] Comment. These instructions or directives as they are variously called, which purport to come from the Chinese Politburo, or other top Party or Government organs, and are passed down through subordinate organs, are presumably for Communist political workers in contact with the people.

25X1

2. [REDACTED] Comment. The report also mentions in this connection the towns of Charyong, Nanam (Ranam), and Sariwon, which according to available records do not have airfields.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

25X1